譯者按：馬里恐怖組織“伊穆支援集團(tuán)”近期在馬里西部頻繁襲擊外資企業(yè)，尤其針對(duì)中國(guó)公司，至少有11名中國(guó)公民被綁架，意在削弱軍政府經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)并勒索贖金。中國(guó)是馬里最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴之一，恐怖分子之舉威脅到馬里與中國(guó)的經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系。

2009年至2024年間，中方在馬里的私人投資額達(dá)到16億美元；自2000年以來(lái)，中國(guó)官方在馬里137個(gè)項(xiàng)目上投入了18億美元。

以下報(bào)道選自《中南項(xiàng)目》(China Global South Project)官方網(wǎng)站.

Jihadists allied to Al-Qaeda have launched a blitz of raids on Malian industrial sites run by foreign firms, especially Chinese, as a tactic to undermine the ruling junta.

與“基地”組織結(jié)盟的圣戰(zhàn)分子對(duì)馬里由外國(guó)公司運(yùn)營(yíng)的工業(yè)設(shè)施，尤其是中國(guó)企業(yè)，發(fā)起了一系列突襲行動(dòng)，以此作為削弱執(zhí)政軍政府的一種策略。

While present across wider west Africa, the powerful Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known by its Arabic acronym JNIM, represents the greatest threat to the arid Sahel region today, the United Nations says.

聯(lián)合國(guó)表示，雖然該組織在整個(gè)西非地區(qū)均有存在，但強(qiáng)大的“伊斯蘭和穆斯林支援集團(tuán)”(簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)“伊穆支援集團(tuán)”)如今對(duì)干旱的薩赫勒(Sahel)地區(qū)構(gòu)成了最嚴(yán)重的威脅。

In June, the JNIM warned that its well-armed fighters would target all foreign companies at work in Mali, run by the army since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, as well as any business doing public works for the state without "its authorisation".

今年6月，伊穆支援集團(tuán)警告稱(chēng)，其裝備精良的武裝人員將把所有在馬里開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)的外國(guó)公司作為攻擊目標(biāo)——自2020年和2021年連續(xù)兩次政變以來(lái)，該國(guó)一直由軍方掌權(quán)——以及任何未經(jīng)其“授權(quán)”便為政府從事公共工程的企業(yè)。

A recent UN report found the group's "core ambition remains the creation of an emirate that could challenge the legitimacy of military regimes, force them to cede authority and implement sharia" law, or the Islamic legal code.

一份近期的聯(lián)合國(guó)報(bào)告指出，該組織“核心目標(biāo)依然是建立一個(gè)酋長(zhǎng)國(guó)，以挑戰(zhàn)軍政府的合法性，迫使其讓渡權(quán)力并實(shí)施伊斯蘭教法”。

To that end, the JNIM's raids in the west could allow it "to establish a racketeering network that extorts foreign companies and undermines the legitimacy of the Malian government", while kidnapping foreigners "to ransom them back to their governments", the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) said.

美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所表示，為實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，伊穆支援集團(tuán)在西部的襲擊可能使其“建立起一個(gè)通過(guò)勒索外國(guó)公司來(lái)斂財(cái)?shù)木W(wǎng)絡(luò)，從而削弱馬里政府的合法性”，同時(shí)綁架外國(guó)人并“向其政府索要贖金”。

From the end of July, the JNIM has made good on its threats, attacking seven foreign-run industrial sites in one of Africa's top producers of gold and lithium, according to the AEI.

根據(jù)美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所的數(shù)據(jù)，自7月底以來(lái)，伊穆支援集團(tuán)已經(jīng)實(shí)施威脅，在非洲主要的黃金和鋰生產(chǎn)國(guó)之一的馬里發(fā)動(dòng)了對(duì)7個(gè)外國(guó)運(yùn)營(yíng)工業(yè)設(shè)施的襲擊。

Six of those were run by Chinese firms, most of them in the gold-rich Kayes region to the west, with the jihadists abducting at least 11 Chinese citizens in the raids, AEI analyst Liam Karr told AFP. "From what we can tell, China is bearing the brunt," Karr said.

美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所分析師卡爾(Liam Karr)告訴法新社，其中6個(gè)由中國(guó)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)，大多位于西部富產(chǎn)黃金的卡伊(Kayes)地區(qū)，圣戰(zhàn)分子在襲擊中至少綁架了11名中國(guó)公民?？栒f(shuō)，“從目前情況看，中國(guó)首當(dāng)其沖成為攻擊目標(biāo)?！?/p>

In the wake of the attacks, China's foreign affairs ministry said it had urged the junta "to spare no effort in searching for and rescuing the kidnapped individuals". It said it had "further taken practical and effective measures to ensure the safety of local Chinese citizen institutions and projects".

在襲擊發(fā)生后，中國(guó)外交部表示已敦促馬里軍政府“不遺余力搜尋并營(yíng)救被綁架人員”。中國(guó)外交部還表示，已“進(jìn)一步采取切實(shí)有效措施，保障在當(dāng)?shù)氐闹袊?guó)公民、機(jī)構(gòu)和項(xiàng)目的安全”。

Besides Chinese, the JNIM also kidnapped three Indians at a cement works in the west in early July.

除中國(guó)人外，伊穆支援集團(tuán)還在7月初襲擊了西部一家水泥廠(chǎng)，并綁架了3名印度人。

"The group has no grievances against the Chinese, but it stems from the group's desire to deal a blow to the Malian economy instead," said Bakary Sambe, director of the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute think tank.

設(shè)于達(dá)喀爾的廷巴克圖研究所所長(zhǎng)桑貝(Bakary Sambe)解釋道，“該組織并非對(duì)中國(guó)人懷有怨恨，而是意在打擊馬里的經(jīng)濟(jì)?！?/p>

"Kayes holds strategic value for JNIM as a key economic hub. The region accounts for roughly 80 percent of Mali's gold production and serves as a trade corridor to Senegal", the country's top supplier, according to the Soufan Center consultancy.

因此，美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所警告稱(chēng)，伊穆支援集團(tuán)在西部的攻勢(shì)“威脅到與中國(guó)的經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系”，而中國(guó)“是馬里最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴之一”。

Chinese private investment in Mali came to $1.6 billion between 2009 and 2024, while the Chinese government has poured in $1.8 billion across 137 projects since 2000, AEI figures show.

美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2009年至2024年間，中國(guó)在馬里的私人投資額達(dá)到16億美元；自2000年以來(lái)，中國(guó)政府在馬里137個(gè)項(xiàng)目上投入了18億美元。

After turning its back on former colonial ruler France and the West more broadly, the junta has sought closer ties with China, as well as Russia and Turkey.

在背離前殖民宗主國(guó)法國(guó)及更廣泛的西方之后，軍政府尋求與中國(guó)、俄羅斯和土耳其建立更緊密的關(guān)系。

Russian mercenaries from the Wagner paramilitary group and its successor, Africa Corps, Chinese armoured cars and Turkish drones have helped the Malian army in its more than a decade-long fight against the jihadist insurgency.

俄羅斯的“瓦格納”準(zhǔn)軍事組織及其繼任者“非洲軍團(tuán)”、中國(guó)的裝甲車(chē)以及土耳其的無(wú)人機(jī)，都在這場(chǎng)持續(xù)逾十年的反圣戰(zhàn)叛亂戰(zhàn)斗中支援了馬里政府軍隊(duì)。

For Karr, Russian willingness "to be a disruptor to strengthen its influence" stands "at odds with China, because China wants stability for its business interests".

卡爾指出，俄羅斯“愿意通過(guò)制造動(dòng)蕩來(lái)強(qiáng)化影響力”，這與中國(guó)的立場(chǎng)“背道而馳，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)希望穩(wěn)定，以保障其商業(yè)利益?！?/p>